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A LOGIC FOR ARGUING ABOUT PROBABILITIES IN
MEASURE TEAMS
TAPANI HYTTINEN, GIANLUCA PAOLINI, AND JOUKO VA¨A¨NA¨NEN
Abstract. We use sets of assignments, a.k.a. teams, and measures on them
to define probabilities of first-order formulas in given data. We then axiomatise
first-order properties of such probabilities and prove a completeness theorem
for our axiomatisation. We use the Hardy-Weinberg Principle of biology and
the Bell’s Inequalities of quantum physics as examples.
1. Introduction
The logic of propositions with assigned probabilities is usually associated with
nondeductive methods such as inductive reasoning ([2]). The concept of probability
in such an approach is the degree of confirmation or belief. Instead, in this paper
we assign probabilities to propositions using the frequency interpretation and study
properties of such probabilities. Thus, while probability logic usually focuses on
the question how to assign probabilities to composite formulas, we focus on the
symmetric question how to axiomatise formulas built up from probabilities. To
make using the frequency interpretation possible in defining probabilities we adopt
the approach of team semantics from [9].
Suppose A is a first-order structure with domain A. Suppose furthermore
v0, . . . , vn are variables that have values in A. If we have a set X of assignments of
values to v0, . . . , vn in A, called a team, we may ask, what is the probability that a
randomly chosen assignment in X satisfies a given first-order formula φ(v0, . . . , vn)
in A? For this to make perfect sense we need to specify a probability function for
relevant subsets of X . Our measure teams are exactly such teams. In this paper we
give axioms for making inferences about first-order properties of such probabilities,
and prove the completeness of our axioms.
In the context of experimental science it is natural to consider probabilities of
formulas rather than just the truth values true/false. In the world of Big Data
this is even more relevant. We suggest to take the concept of a measure team as
a starting point and use it to compute the probabilities of formulas, rather than
having the probabilities as given, as in the probability logic of [2, 3]. In a sense we
can argue about the probabilities and have the evidence—the data, or team as we
call it—as part of the discussion.
The measure teams that arise from actual experiments are, of course, finite.
Indeed, the simplest measure teams consist just of a finite number of assignments
of values to fixed variables, as in the table Figure 1 of 8 rows of binary data. An
example of a finite measure team in biology is a pool of genes. One of the pioneering
mathematical results in genetics is the Hardy-Weinberg Theorem which shows that
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v0 v1 v2 v3
0 1 1 0 1
1 1 1 1 1
2 1 1 1 1
3 1 1 1 0
4 0 0 1 1
5 0 0 0 0
6 0 0 0 0
7 0 0 0 0
Figure 1. A discrete measure team
a conservation phenomenon takes place in a gene pool from generation to generation
under certain assumptions, such as random mating. The Hardy-Weinberg Theorem
is an example of a property of measure teams that can be expressed and proved in
our setup.
Despite the finiteness of teams arising from experiments, we consider in this
paper mainly infinite teams, typically continuum size, which abstract away the
finiteness of empirical observations. Our Completeness Theorem (Theorem 5.3)
is with respect to infinite measure teams. A paradigm example is an idealised
measurement of given variables v0, . . . , vn at all points of time starting at time 0
and ending at time 1 (see Figure 2). The values of the variables can be e.g. real
numbers which change continuously with time. Thus we have an assignment st that
depends continuously on time t and interprets variables v0, . . . , v3 at every point of
time. When time progresses from 0 to 1, the vector (st(v0), . . . , st(v3)) flows from
(s0(v0), . . . , s0(v3)) to (s1(v0), . . . , s1(v3)). It seems appropriate to call such teams
continuous teams as the assignment changes continuously with time. In physical
sciences variables, such as temperature, speed, pressure, amplitude, force, etc, are
typically continuous in time. Therefore the concept of continuous team would seem
to cover a lot of examples. Continuous teams (when considered with respect to the
Lebesgue measure) are examples of measure teams, the topic of this paper.
t v0 v1 v2 v3
0 s0(v0) s0(v1) s0(v2) s0(v3)
...
...
...
...
...
t st(v0) st(v1) st(v2) st(v3)
...
...
...
...
...
1 s1(v0) s1(v1) s1(v2) s1(v3)
Figure 2. A continuous measure team
2. Measure Teams
We denote by Var = {vi | i < ω} the set of individual first-order variables.
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Definition 2.1 (Multi-team). A multi-team X with values in A and domain
dom(X) ⊆ Var is a pair (Ω, τ) such that Ω is a set and τ : Ω → Adom(X) is a
function.
Given a multi-team (Ω, τ), if we put a probability measure on Ω we get a prob-
abilistic notion of team. Of course, for this definition to be useful one has to put
also some measurability conditions on τ . This idea leads to the notion of measure
team, which is the focus of the present paper.
Definition 2.2 (Measure team). Let L be a signature and A an L-structure. A
measure team X with values in A and domain dom(X) ⊆ Var is a quadruple
(Ω,F , P, τ) such that (Ω,F , P ) is a probability space and τ : Ω → Adom(X) is a
measurable function, in the sense that{
i ∈ Ω | A |=t(i) φ
}
∈ F
for every first-order L-formula φ with free variables in dom(X).
If X = (Ω,F , P, τ) is countable, then the natural choice for F is P(Ω), i.e. the
whole power set of Ω, and measurability of τ is automatically ensured. In the
uncountable case, the situation is of course more delicate.
Definition 2.3 (Probability). Let L be a signature, A an L-structure, X =
(Ω,F , P, τ) a measure team with values in A and φ a first-order L-formula with
free variables in dom(X). We let
[φ]X = P (
{
i ∈ Ω | A |=τ(i) φ
}
).
That is, [φ]X is the probability that a randomly chosen assignment from X
satisfies φ. Notice that because of the measurability conditions imposed on τ , the
above definition makes sense.
Example 2.4. In Figure 1 we have an example of a measure team X = (Ω,F , P, τ)
with values in the boolean algebra on two elements A = ({0, 1}, 0,∨,∧,¬), where
(Ω,P(Ω), P ) is the set with eight elements endowed with the normalized counting
measure (measure of one point is 18 ), the domain of X is {v0, v1, v2, v3} and τ is as
in the figure, e.g. τ(0)((v0, v1, v2, v3)) = (1, 1, 0, 1). If we consider the variables vi
as propositional variables, then in this case
[v0 ∧ v1]X =
1
2
,
because 50% of the rows satisfy the propositional formula v0 ∧ v1. We will call
measure teams of this particular kind boolean multi-teams. In [7] a system of
propositional logic based on boolean multi-teams has been investigated.
We denote by R = (R, 0, 1,+,−, ·,6) the ordered field of real numbers, with L
the σ-algebra of Lebesgue measurable subsets of [0, 1] and with P the Lebesgue
measure on [0, 1].
Example 2.5. Let (fi : [0, 1]→ R))i<3 be continuous functions, and let τ : [0, 1]→
R{v0,v1,v2} so that τ(a)(vi) = fi(a), for i < 3. Then X = ([0, 1],L, P, τ) is a
measure team, which we called above continuous measure team, with values in R.
This follows from elementary properties of continuous functions and elimination of
quantifiers for R.
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3. Measure Team Logic
Our measure team logic is concerned with making inferences about the proba-
bilities themselves, not about how probabilities of composite formulas depend on
probabilities of the subformulas. An example of a valid sentence of our measure
team logic is
|φ| = |φ ∧ ψ|+ |φ ∧ ¬ψ|,
where |φ| denotes the probability of φ in the team in question. Thus our logic has
built in function symbols +, · for expressing arithmetic relations between probabil-
ities.
We now define measure team logic. Let L0 be a countable signature, Q ⊆ R
countable and n 6 ω. The intended Q is the set of rational numbers Q (or even
Q ∩ [0, 1]). We define the signature LQ and L1 as follows
LQ = {0, 1,+,−, ·,6} ∪ {cq | q ∈ Q}
L1 = L1(L0, n) = LQ ∪ {|φ(x)| | φ(x) L0-formula x = (vi)i<n} ,
where the cq and |φ(x)| are constant symbols. Note that |φ(x)| is considered just
as a constant symbol, however complicated the formula φ(x) is. Without loss of
generality we may assume that L0 ∩ L1 = ∅, this is to avoid possible confusion.
A typical (atomic) formula of our logic is of the form
|φ(x)| = |ψ(x)|
with the meaning that a randomly chosen assignment from our team is as likely to
satisfy φ(x) as it is to satisfy ψ(x). Another typical (atomic) formula is of the form
|φ(x)| = |ψ(x)| + |θ(x)|
with the meaning that the probability that a randomly chosen assignment from our
team satisfies φ(x) is the sum of the corresponding probabilities for ψ(x) and θ(x).
Given a measure team X with values in A and dom(X) = {vi | i < n}, we let
RXQ be the expansion of R = (R, 0, 1,+,−, ·,6) to an L1-structure obtained by
interpreting the constant cq as the real number q, and by letting
|φ(x)|R
X
Q = [φ(x)]X ,
where [φ(x)]X is as in Definition 2.3. Thus, [φ(x)]X is the value of the constant
symbol |φ(x)| in RXQ .
Definition 3.1 (Semantics). Let Σ be an L1-theory, A an L0-structure, X a mea-
sure team with values in A and dom(X) = {vi | i < n}. We define
X |= Σ ⇔def R
X
Q |= Σ.
Definition 3.2 (Logical consequence). Let T be an L0-theory and Σ ∪ {α} an
L1-theory. We define
(T,Σ) |= α
if for every A |= T and every measure team X with values in A such that dom(X) =
{vi | i < n}, we have that
X |= Σ ⇒ X |= α.
A LOGIC FOR ARGUING ABOUT PROBABILITIES IN MEASURE TEAMS 5
We now define a deductive system (T,Σ) ⊢ α with T an L0-theory, Σ an L1-
theory and α an L0-formula or an L1-formula. Of course what we are really in-
terested in is the case when α is an L1-formula, but for things to work, i.e. to
prove completeness, we also have to admit the case in which α is an L0-formula.
The deductive system ⊢ has three components: ⊢0, ⊢1 and ⊢2. The component ⊢0
allows to deduce L0-formulas from L0-formulas, the component ⊢1 allows to deduce
L1-formulas from L1-formulas and the component ⊢2 allows to deduce L1-formulas
from L0-formulas. The component ⊢0 is simply the deductive system of first-order
logic with respect to L0-formulas. The component ⊢1 is the deductive system of
first-order logic with respect to L1-formulas plus the axioms RCF
∗ = Th(RQ) (or
any axiomatization thereof). Finally, the component ⊢2 consists of three axioms
(A0)-(A2) and one rule (R0), as below:
(A0)
|φ ∧ ¬φ| = 0
(A1)
|φ ∨ ¬φ| = 1
(A2)
|φ ∨ ψ| = |φ|+ |ψ| − |φ ∧ ψ|
∨
i<k
∧
j<mi
∀x(φij(x)→ ψ
i
j(x))
(R0) ∨
i<k
∧
j<mi
(|φij(x)| 6 |ψ
i
j(x)|)
where in rule (R0) we assume that the formulas ∀x(φij(x)→ ψ
i
j(x)) are sentences.
As an example of the use of our deductive system we show that
⊢ |φ| = |φ ∧ ψ|+ |φ ∧ ¬ψ|.
First of all notice that
φ ∧ ψ ∧ φ ∧ ¬ψ ↔ ψ ∧ ¬ψ
(R0)
|φ ∧ ψ ∧ φ ∧ ¬ψ| = |ψ ∧ ¬ψ|
(A0)
|ψ ∧ ¬ψ| = 0
|φ ∧ ψ ∧ φ ∧ ¬ψ| = 0
Secondly, let α = |(φ ∧ ψ) ∨ (φ ∧ ¬ψ)| = |φ ∧ ψ|+ |φ ∧ ¬ψ| − |φ ∧ ψ ∧ φ ∧ ¬ψ| and
notice that
(A2) α |φ ∧ ψ ∧ φ ∧ ¬ψ| = 0
|(φ ∧ ψ) ∨ (φ ∧ ¬ψ)| = |φ ∧ ψ|+ |φ ∧ ¬ψ|
Finally, we conclude
φ↔ (φ ∧ ψ) ∨ (φ ∧ ¬ψ)
(R0)
|φ| = |(φ ∧ ψ) ∨ (φ ∧ ¬ψ)| |(φ ∧ ψ) ∨ (φ ∧ ¬ψ)| = |φ ∧ ψ|+ |φ ∧ ¬ψ|
|φ| = |φ ∧ ψ|+ |φ ∧ ¬ψ|
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4. Some examples
Example 4.1. In this example we look at the usefulness of quantification when
one expresses conditions on probabilities. This example is hypothetical in many
senses but it is faithful to the calculations of quantum mechanics.
Suppose that we have two observables v1 and v2 which can take values from the
set {1, 2, 3, 4}, a device that produces particles such that they are all in the same
unknown pure state and that someone has produced a large table X of measure-
ments of these observables from the particles produced by the device (usually it
is impossible to measure the two observables independently from one particle but
we overlook this kind of problems here, in [7] we have studied logical questions
related to the impossibility of experimentally producing tables with values for all
observables from every particle).
In physics this kind of situation is typically modelled by two self-adjoint operators
in a 4-dimensional Hilbert space. Let P be the operator for v1 and p(i), i ∈
{1, 2, 3, 4}, its eigenvectors with eigenvalue i. Similarly, let Q be the operator for v2
and q(i) its eigenvectors. Notice that when one knows the operators P and Q, it is
possible to calculate the coordinates of the vectors p(i) in the basis of eigenvectors
of Q.
Can we express in measure team logic the condition that the measurements are
in harmony with the theory? Yes, the following is expressible in our logic: there
are four complex numbers (pairs of reals) cn, n ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, such that for all
i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} the following holds: |ci|2 = [v1 = i]X and |〈s|q(i)〉|2 = [v2 = i]X ,
where 〈·|·〉 is the inner product and
s = (1/2)
4∑
n=1
cnp(n).
This is exactly the condition that our data X agrees with the theory.
Example 4.2. This is an example of the use of T in theories (T,Σ). We look at
homogeneous Markov chains (see e.g. [8, pg. 61]). We think of variables (vi)i<ω as
random variables and elements of the team X as tests. The value of the random
variable vj in the test i ∈ Ω is τ(i)(vj). Figuratively speaking, the team X consists
of rows of data concerning the random variables vi. We give axioms which say that
the sequence (vi)i<ω of random variables is a Markov process. The state space
of a Markov process is usually assumed to be countable which is not a first-order
property. However, if one looks at chains in which the state diagram has some
additional properties (after we remove some of the arrows with probability 0) we
can overcome this problem. The additional property we study here is that there
is some natural number N such that from each node in the state diagram at most
N arrows with non-zero probability go out. We also assume that the chain has an
initial state from which every process starts. The main example in our mind of this
is the random walk in a space of dimension N/2.
Markov chains with these properties can be axiomatized as follows in measure
team logic: The vocabulary of T consists of a binary relation E and constants cη,
η ∈ N<ω. The theory T says the following for all η, ξ ∈ N<ω:
(a) (cη, a) ∈ E iff a = cη⌢(i) for some i < N .
(b) If cη = cξ then for all i < N , cη⌢(i) = cξ⌢(i).
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As an initial state we take (the interpretation of) c and notice that if A |= T , then
the set GA of the interpretations of the constants equipped with E ∩ (GA × GA)
is a connected directed graph and every state diagram satisfying our assumptions
(after removing some of the useless arrows) can be obtained from a model of T in
this way. Also it is worth noticing that any process that starts from the initial state
stays inside GA.
We let n = ω and describe the probabilities as a Markov process that starts from
the initial state. Thus Σ consists of the following for all i, j < ω, η ∈ N<ω and
k < N :
(A) |v0 = c| = 1.
(B) |E(vi, vi+1)| = 1.
(C) (|vi = cη| = 0) ∨ (|vi = cη| = 0) ∨
(|vi = cη ∧ vi+1 = cη⌢(k)||vj = cη| = |vj = cη ∧ vj+1 = cη⌢(k)||vi = cη|).
A team X satisfies Σ if and only if the stochastic process consisting of the values
of the random variables (vi)i<ω in X is a Markov chain.
Example 4.3 (The Hardy-Weinberg Principle). In the early days of biology there
was an apparent paradox: It seemed that in any population the dominant alleles
should eventually drive out the recessive ones, but this was not supported by ob-
servations and experimental data. The Hardy-Weinberg Principle ([5, 10]) explains
why in a randomly mating population the recessive alleles stabilise to maintain a
fixed portion, even after just one generation.
We consider a diallelic gene with alleles A and a. The logically—but not at all
biologically—possible genotypes form the 27 element set
M = {AA,Aa, aa} × {AA,Aa, aa} × {AA,Aa, aa},
where the first component of the triples is the genotype of the father, the second
that of the mother and the third that of the child. Let L0 be the following signature
(f for father, m for mother and c for child){
P jk | j ∈ {f,m, c} and k ∈ {AA,Aa, aa}
}
,
where the P jk are unary predicate symbols. We get an L0-structure by defining
M = (M, (P jk )
M)j,k,
where
(P fk )
M = {(u, v, w) ∈M : u = k},
(Pmk )
M = {(u, v, w) ∈M : v = k} and (P ck )
M = {(u, v, w) ∈M : w = k}.
Thus M is simply the set M of logically possible genotypes with their internal
structure accessible via the predicates P jk . Now we can look at measure teams
of assignments of variables in this structure. We focus on three variables v0, v1
and v2, representing three generations. Such a measure team can be thought of as
genetic data about three generations of a population. We disregard mating across
generations, so for us the next generation is always the children.
More formally, a measure team X , relevant for the purpose of the Hardy-
Weinberg Principle, is a quadruple ({1, . . . , n},P({1, . . . , n}), P, τ) such that P
is the uniform probability on {1, . . . , n} and τ : {1, . . . , n} → M{v0,v1,v2} is an
arbitrary function. For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n} the assignment τ(i) records a father-
mother-child triple of the first generation (v0), second generation (v1) and the third
generation (v2).
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For the language L1 we choose Q = Q. Let ΣHW consist of the below L1-
equations (1)-(5). Remember that the language L1 contains all the constant sym-
bols |φ(x)|, where φ(x) is an arbitrary L0-formula. So (1)-(5) are atomic sentences,
more exactly equations of constant terms.
(1) |P jk (vi+1)| = |P
c
k (vi)|,
for j = f,m, k = AA,Aa, aa and i = 0, 1;
(2) |P fk (vi+1) ∧ P
m
z (vi+1)| = |P
f
k (vi+1) ∧ P
m
z (vi+1) ∧ P
c
w(vi+1)|
for (k, z, w) = (AA,AA,AA), (AA, aa,Aa), (aa,AA,Aa), (aa, aa, aa) and i = 0, 1;
(3) |P fk (vi+1) ∧ P
m
l (vi+1)| = 2 · |P
f
k (vi+1) ∧ P
m
l (vi+1) ∧ P
c
m(vi+1)|
for (k, l,m) = (AA,Aa,AA), (AA,Aa,Aa), (aa,Aa,Aa), (aa,Aa, aa), (Aa, aa, aa),
(Aa,AA,Aa), (Aa, aa,Aa), (Aa,AA,AA), (Aa,Aa,Aa) and i = 0, 1;
(4) |P fk (vi+1) ∧ P
m
l (vi+1)| = 4 · |P
f
k (vi+1) ∧ P
m
l (vi+1) ∧ P
c
m(vi+1)|
for (k, l,m) = (Aa,Aa,AA), (Aa,Aa, aa) and i = 0, 1;
(5) |P fk (vi+1) ∧ P
m
l (vi+1)| = |P
f
k (vi+1)| · |P
m
l (vi+1)|
for k = AA,Aa, aa, l = AA,Aa, aa and i = 0, 1.
The formulas of type (1) express that allele frequencies are equal in the sexes,
the formulas of type (2)-(4) specify how the genotypes are inherited, according to
Mendel’s Principles, and the formulas of type (5) express that mating is random,
an important assumption of the Hardy-Weinberg Principle.
Finally, let αHW be the conjunction of the following L1-equations:
|P cAA(v1)| = |P
c
AA(v2)|
|P cAa(v1)| = |P
c
Aa(v2)|
|P caa(v1)| = |P
c
aa(v2)|.
These conjuncts say that the genotype frequencies among the children in the second
and third generations are the same, i.e. a stable balance achieves already at the
second generation.
Thus, all the assumptions of the Hardy-Weinberg Principle are formalizable in
our logic. Since the Hardy-Weinberg Principle is true and our logic is complete (see
Section 5), it follows that
ΣHW ⊢ αHW,
i.e. our deductive system proves (a formalization) of the Hardy-Weinber Principle.
Example 4.4 (Bell’s Inequalities). In [7], among other things, we presented a
system of probability logic capable to handle so-called logical Bell’s inequalities [1].
Suppose X = (Ω,F , P, τ) is a boolean multi-team (see Example 2.4) the domain
of which contains the proposition symbols of some given propositional formulas
(φj)j<k. Then
(6)
∑
j<k
[φj ]X 6 k − 1 + [
∧
j<k
φj ]X .
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If furthermore the formula
∧
j<k φj is contradictory (in the sense of propositional
logic), then [
∧
j<k φj ]X = 0. Thus, the inequality (6) becomes
(7)
∑
j<k
[φj ]X 6 k − 1.
Inequalities of this form (7) are of great importance in foundations of quantum
mechanics, see [1] and [7]. Because of the completeness result presented in the next
section, we will see that this inequalities are provable in our logic. For suitably
chosen propositional formulas (φj)j<k, representing propositions about Quantum
Mechanics, the inequality (7) fails thereby demonstrating the contextuality of prob-
abilities in the quantum world. To remedy this a quantum team logic is introduced
in [7]. In the quantum team logic the problematic inequalities (7) are not prov-
able but we still have a Completeness Theorem with respect to quantum teams, a
generalization of the concept of a measure team.
5. Completeness
In this section we prove that the deductive system described in Section 3 is
complete with respect to the given semantics. We begin with a Lindenbaum’s
Lemma like result for our deductive system. As in Section 3, let L0 be a countable
signature, Q ⊆ R countable and n 6 ω.
Lemma 5.1. Suppose that (T,Σ) 0⊥. Then there are a complete L0-theory T0
and a complete L1-theory Σ0 such that T ⊆ T0, Σ ⊆ Σ0 and (T0,Σ0) 0⊥.
Proof. We first construct T0 as a limit of a chain (T
∗
i )i<ω of L0-theories. Let (φi)i<ω
be an enumeration of the L0-sentences. By induction on i < ω we construct T
∗
i
so that (T ∗i ,Σ) 0⊥ and either φi ∈ T
∗
i+1 or ¬φi ∈ T
∗
i+1. If i = 0, let T
∗
0 = T . If
i = j + 1, there are three cases.
Case 1. T ∗j ⊢ φj . Let T
∗
i = T
∗
j ∪ {φj}.
Case 2. T ∗j ⊢ ¬φj . Let T
∗
i = T
∗
j ∪ {¬φj}.
Case 3. T ∗j 0 φj , i.e. T
∗
j ∪ {¬φj} 0⊥, and T
∗
j 0 ¬φj , i.e. T
∗
j ∪ {φj} 0⊥. For the
sake of a contradiction, suppose that
(T ∗j ∪ {φj} ,Σ) ⊢⊥ and (T
∗
j ∪ {¬φj} ,Σ) ⊢⊥ .
We show this is impossible and then extend T ∗j with φj if (T
∗
j ∪ {φj} ,Σ) 0⊥, and
¬φj otherwise. Given that T ∗j ∪ {φj} 0⊥, there must exists t < ω so that letting
χs =
∨
i<ks
∧
j<m(i,s)
∀x(φs(i,j) → ψ
s
(i,j)) and χ
′
s =
∨
i<ks
∧
j<m(i,s)
(|φs(i,j)| 6 |ψ
s
(i,j)|),
for s 6 t, we have that
T ∗j ∪ {φj}
χ0
(R0)
χ′0
T ∗j ∪ {φj}
· · ·
(R0)
· · ·
T ∗j ∪ {φj}
χt
(R0)
χ′t Σ
⊥
Notice though that our deductive system proves that formulas in
∧∨∧
form are
equivalent to formulas in
∨∧
form, and so we have that
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χ0 · · · χt∧
s6t χs
χ∧
s6t χs
χ0 · · · χt
where χ is the formula in
∨∧
form equivalent to
∧
s6t χs. In substance, without
loss of generality we can simplify the situation assuming that t = 0 and thus
T ∗j ∪ {φj}∨
i<k0
∧
j<m(i,0)
∀x(φ0(i,j) → ψ
0
(i,j))
(R0) ∨
i<k0
∧
j<m(i,0)
(|φ0(i,j)| 6 |ψ
0
(i,j)|) Σ
⊥
Analogously, given that T ∗j ∪ {¬φj} 0⊥, we have that
T ∗j ∪ {¬φj}∨
i<k1
∧
j<m(i,1)
∀x(φ1(i,j) → ψ
1
(i,j))
(R0) ∨
i<k1
∧
j<m(i,1)
(|φ1(i,j)| 6 |ψ
1
(i,j)|) Σ
⊥
But then
T ∗j ∪ {φj ∨ ¬φj}∨
s<2, i<ks
∧
j<m(i,s)
∀x(φs(i,j) → ψ
s
(i,j))
(R0) ∨
s<2, i<ks
∧
j<m(i,s)
(|φs(i,j)| 6 |ψ
s
(i,j)|) Σ
⊥
which contradicts the fact that (T ∗j ,Σ) 0⊥. We now construct Σ0. First of all, let
Σ′ be the deductive closure of Σ under the axioms RCF∗ and the rule (R0) with
premises from T0. Then (T0,Σ
′) must be consistent because otherwise there would
be i < ω such that (T ∗i ,Σ) is not consistent. Now, just extend Σ
′ to a complete
L1-theory Σ0 using the Lindembaum’s Lemma of first-order logic. Then (T0,Σ0) is
as wanted.
Before proving a completeness result, we need some elementary facts about el-
ementary extensions of the ordered field of real numbers R = (R, 0, 1,+,−, ·,6).
Let B be an elementary extension of R. We say that b ∈ B is finite if there
exist r, s ∈ R such that r < b < s. We denote by Fin(B) the set of finite el-
ements of B. Given b ∈ Fin(B) we denote by st(b) the standard part of b, i.e.
sup({r ∈ R : r < b}) (for details see e.g. [4, Section 5.6]). By positive bounded
formulas we mean formulas which are built up from atomic formulas by means of
conjunction ∧, disjunction ∨, universal quantification ∀ and bounded existential
quantification ∃x(−n 6 x 6 n ∧ φ).
Fact 5.2. Let B be an elementary extension of R. Then, the map st : Fin(B)→ R
preserves positive bounded formulas.
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Proof. This can be proved by a straightforward induction on the complexity of
positive formulas. Only the atomic case is interesting. For it see e.g. [6, Theorem
6.7] or [4, Theorem 5.6.2] (in [6] and [4] proofs are with respect to the hyperreals
but they work for any elementary extension of R).
Theorem 5.3 (Completeness). Let T be an L0-theory and Σ a positive bounded
L1-theory. Then the following are equivalent.
(i) There exists A |= T and a measure team X = (Ω,F , P, τ) with values in A
and dom(X) = {vi | i < n}, such that X |= Σ.
(ii) (T,Σ) 0⊥.
(iii) As in (i), with Ω = [0, 1], F the σ-algebra L of Lebesgue measurable subsets
of [0, 1] and P the Lebesgue measure on [0, 1].
Proof. We only prove (ii) implies (iii). Suppose that (T,Σ) 0⊥. By Lemma 5.1 we
can find a complete L0-theory T0 and complete L1-theory Σ0 such that T ⊆ T0,
Σ ⊆ Σ0 and (T0,Σ0) 0⊥. In particular, the theories T0 and Σ0 are consistent
(with respect to the deductive system of first-order logic), because otherwise we
would be able to derive a contradiction also from our deductive system. Let then
B |= Σ0. Given that our deductive system contains RCF
∗ = Th(RQ), we can—
without loss of generality—assume that RQ 4 B ↾ LQ. To see this, just take a
sufficiently saturated elementary extension of RQ and think of Σ0 as a type of the
theory RCF∗ ⊆ Σ0 in the variables |φ(x)|. We now expand RQ to an L1-structure
by letting
|φ(x)|R
X
Q = st(|φ(x)|B)
for every L0-formula φ(x) in the free variables x = (vi)i<n. By Fact 5.2 we have
RXQ |= Σ. We now want to define A |= T0 as well as a measure team X =
([0, 1],L, P, τ) with values in A and dom(X) = {vi | i < n}, so that
|φ(x)|R
X
Q = [φ(x)]X
for every L0-formula φ(x) in the free variables x. As to A, we can let it be any
ω-saturated model of T0 (ω-compactness suffices if n < ω). As to the team X , we
do the following. Let (φi(x))i<ω be an enumeration of the L0-formulas in the free
variables x (remember that x is a vector). We label 2<ω with subsets Iσ ⊆ [0, 1)
as in Figure 3 (where for simplicity we let |φ| = |φ(x)|R
X
Q , φ(1,1) = φ0 ∧ φ1 and
φ(0,1) = ¬φ0 ∧ φ1).
Because of (A0)-(A2) and (R0), given s ∈ [0, 1) and 1 6 i < j < ω, we have
s ∈ Iσi ∧ Iσj for unique σi ∈ 2
i and σj ∈ 2j, and moreover σi ⊆ σj . Thus, to every
s ∈ [0, 1) we can associate
fs =
⋃
16i<ω
σi ∈ 2
ω.
Let
tp(fs) = {
∧
i<m
φ
fs(i)
i (x) | 1 6 m < ω}.
Then, because of (A0) and (R0), the type tp(fs) is finitely satisfiable and hence
satisfiable in A (ω-saturated models realize types over the empty set in infinitely
many variables). Let then as ∈ A such that as |= tp(fs) and
τ(s)(x) =
{
a ∈ A|x| if s = 1
as if s ∈ [0, 1).
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∅
[0, |φ0|)
[0, |φ(1,1)|)
· · · · · ·
[|φ(1,1)|, |φ0|)
· · ·
[|φ0|, 1)
[|φ0|, |φ0|+ |φ(0,1)|)
· · · ·
[|φ0|+ |φ(0,1)|, 1)
· · ·
Figure 3. Labelling 2<ω with Iσ ⊆ [0, 1)
Then X = ([0, 1],L, P, τ) is as desired.
The following standard counterexample shows that the positivity of Σ is a nec-
essary condition in Theorem 5.3.
Example 5.4. Let L0 consists of a single unary predicate R, T be the empty
theory and
Σ = {|R(x)| > 0} ∪ {|R(x)| 6
1
n
| 0 < n < ω}.
Then (T,Σ) 0⊥, because Σ is finitely satisfiable, but (i) of Theorem 5.3 fails, as in
fact there is no way to expand RQ to an L1-structure RXQ so that R
X
Q |= Σ.
On the other hand, if we insist on Σ being finite we can prove Theorem 5.3
without the positive bounded assumption.
Theorem 5.5. As in Theorem 5.3 with Σ finite and arbitrary, i.e. not necessarily
positive bounded.
Proof. The proof is essentially as in Theorem 5.3. We only have to specify how to
define |φ(x)|R
X
Q in this case. We do this. Let Σ0 and B |= Σ0 as in the proof of
Theorem 5.3. First of all, extend Σ to a Σ′ adding the following formulas for every
|φ(x)| and |ψ(x)| occurring in Σ:
(i) 0 6 |φ(x)| 6 1;
(ii) |¬φ(x)| = 1− |φ(x)|;
(iii) |φ(x)| = |φ(x) ∧ ψ(x)|+ |φ(x) ∧ ¬ψ(x)|;
(iv) |φ(x) ∨ ψ(x)| = |φ(x)| + |ψ(x)| − |φ(x) ∧ ψ(x)|.
Further extend Σ′ to a Σ′′ requiring that if |φ(x)| = 0 ∈ Σ0 and |φ(x)| occurs in
Σ, then |φ(x)| = 0 ∈ Σ′′. Items (i)-(iv) are theorems of our logic, and so Σ′′ ⊆ Σ0.
Secondly, notice that it suffices to specify |φ(x)|R
X
Q only for the |φ(x)| occurring in
Σ′′, but this is easily done—just consider
∧
Σ′′, substitute constants of the form
|φ(x)| with free variables, quantify existentially and find a real solution using the
fact that RQ 4 B ↾ LQ. The rest of the proof is clear (in this case enumerate only
the L0-formulas that occur in Σ and construct a finite tree).
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Corollary 5.6. Let T be an L0-theory and Σ ∪ {α} a finite L1-theory. Then
(T,Σ) ⊢ α ⇔ (T,Σ) |= α
The main source of inspiration for our logic is of course for T = T0 = Th(A),
with A a particular L0-structure. If we wish the class of teams with values in A to
be complete in the sense of providing every possible counterexample for (T,Σ) 0⊥
(as in Theorem 5.3), then we have to require ω-compactness or ω-saturation (de-
pending on whether n < ω or n = ω) of A. If A is finite then, of course, we do
not have this problem (since it is ω-saturated). In particular, for L0 the signa-
ture of boolean algebras and A the boolean algebra {0, 1}, we have a system of
propositional probability logic properly extending the probability logic considered
in [7].
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